Two theories for the regulatory problem of digital democracy: technofeudalism, dependency theory, and the political economy of algorithms

Abstract

This article explores two theoretical frameworks – technofeudalism and dependency theory – to address the regulatory challenges of digital democracy. It examines how digital platforms, dominated by private corporations, undermine traditional democratic principles by centralizing control over data, algorithms, and digital infrastructure. The technofeudalist perspective likens this dynamic to feudal structures, where “digital lords” (big tech companies) exploit user-generated data without fair reciprocity, creating regulatory gaps due to the opacity and transnational nature of their operations. Conversely, an updated dependency theory interprets these issues as an extension of historical North-South asymmetries, where the Global South remains technologically and economically dependent on the Global North, perpetuating colonial-like exploitation through data extraction and algorithmic dominance. The article highlights the tension between national regulatory efforts and the globalized, privatized nature of digital spaces, emphasizing the erosion of digital sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. It argues for urgent regulatory frameworks that align digital governance with constitutional principles, ensuring transparency, accountability, and equitable participation in the digital sphere.